Reality as Substance, Process, and Value by Tsanoff, Radoslav A.
REALITY AS SUBSTANCE, PROCESS, AND VALUE" 
HE historian of philosophy who traces the development 
of men's basic ideas and problems is bound to recognize, 
beyond the specific differences of doctrine and method which 
distinguish the various thinkers, certain fundamental out- 
looks on reality. In some degree all of them have engaged 
philosophical reflection from its earliest beginnings in Greece, 
but the history of ideas manifests a shifting emphasis on one 
or another of these basic approaches to nature. Some inter- 
esting problems of interpretation are thus brought to our 
attention. 
I t  should prevent initial misunderstanding if it is stated 
clearly that the three world-views listed in our title are not to 
be regarded as mutually exclusive alternatives but rather as 
complementary. Nor is the list of them to be considered as 
exhaustive. Their order as given here-substance, Process, 
Value-is not meant to indicate progressive adequacy in every 
respect, from partial error to perfect truth of interpretation; 
nor on the other hand do they represent a mere variety of 
standpoints, indifferently on a par as insights into reality. 
One more warning is not only needed but also proves 
useful at the outset of our inquiry. We sllould not fieglect 
the interrelations of these different outlooks on nature, and 
also of some others that we shall have to consider. Goethe 
may teach us wisdom here in his two lines packed with 
meaning: 
To reach unto the I&nite, 
Distinguish first, but then, unite! 
Prior to clear distinction or adequate synthesis, the early 
" A paper read before the Historical Society of the Rice Institute 
on February 12,1953. 
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Greek theories of nature reflected vague fusion of Substance 
and Process as fuildanlental principles of interpretation. We 
sllould note the varied and also somewhat indefinite connota- 
tioa of the Greek term for nature, physis. Physis meant origin 
or birr11 and growth, the source or process of activity in a 
thing, how it arises alld comes to realize its character and 
constitution. When this active principle was considered as 
the basic or essential element, physis signified the primary 
matter, the substance or matrix of which things are made. 
Or else the essence of things was regarded as their form or 
system of relations, and physis was viewed as the cosmic 
order and by extension the universe. The Latin te rn  nafura 
had a similar flexibility of meaning. I t  was derived from the 
verb nascor meaning "to be born," and so signified the birth 
or original production of a thing and also its essential sub- 
stance and constitution, the orderly source and course and 
pattern of things. Might we use the term "bearing" to express 
this dual meaning: the bearing of things? Even in this verbal 
analysis the student of ancient tllougllt may recognize hints 
of leading ideas in contending philosophical tl~eories. Later 
thought has carried on this interplay of the categories of 
Substance and Process, of things and agencies. 
The first of these views, which is here called Substance, is 
concerned mainly with tile objects of experience. I t  regards 
nature as a sum or system of existent things or substances. 
It recognizes their teeming variety and seeks to describe their 
characteristic differences, but i t  does not accept nlutiplicity 
and variety as the last word of understanding. It explores 
the relations of digerent things and their likely explanation 
as forms of some basic substance or substances, This problem 
of the primary stuff or elemental being marked the first chap- 
ter of ancient science and phiIosophy, in Ionian Greece: 
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What is the world made of? The early explorers of nature 
were versatile in their cosmological ventures. They tried to 
reduce the immense variety of beings to some primary stuff, 
as it were in a chemistry of one element: water or air or some 
less obviously definable, infinite matrix of all substances. Or 
they emphasized the irreducible differences of things, in 
various doctrines of a plurality of elements. The character- 
istic nature of things was conceived by some of them not as 
matter or st& but as fundamental form, and the world-order 
was regarded quantitatively as a system of calculable rela- 
tions. 
The basic view of Substance has emphasized a spatial out- 
look on nature, things located and related to each other 
spatially, expanding or condensing, joined or separated in 
space. The problem of change tended to focus on the recog- 
nition and explanation of motion, The atomists expounded 
as final truth their doctrine of a world of material particles 
moving in space. This view of nature as an immense system 
of substances is characteristic of our intellectual tradition, 
and of course for many purposes of description and explana- 
tion it has served very well. This table, these chairs, the walls 
of the room in which we are assembled, a11 of them exist in 
their substantial identity and respective location, even as 
everyone is out there seated in his chair. Our knowledge of 
things involves precise and reliable accounts of their qualities 
and relations: their shape, texture, color, sound, heat, motion 
or rest, and the ways in which the perceived stability or 
change in any of these and other qualities and conditions 
affect other bodies. This is a rough statement of our ordinary 
fdeas of nature, 
While this cosmology seemed obvious to common sense, 
its final adequacy was questioned by some critical minds in 
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antiquity and by many more in modern science and phi- 
losophy. It is in its way correct, but is it a thoroughly true 
version of nature and human nature? A serious objection to 
it has been that it yields a defective account of mind and 
rational activity. Socrates, to be sure, was an object in space, 
with his bones and muscles and the rest of him inside his 
skin, walking in the streets of Athens or sitting in his prison 
cell. But this account missed the main points in Socrates' 
nature and career: his inquiring mind, his power to stimulate 
and to enlighten other minds, his loyalty to his convictions 
that led him to remain in prison and await his death rather 
than to escape, though the gates were open, If we should 
try to explain these really important characteristics of Soc- 
rates in terms of moving particles in space, it would be, as 
Plato called it, "an idle way of speaking." 
One way out of this difficulty has been to retain the basic 
view of Substance, but recognize two kinds of substances, 
some of them bodies existing and moving in space, but others 
non-spatial and immaterial, minds. This was the dualistic 
cosmology of Descartes which inaugurated systematic mod- 
ern philosophy. Descartes was firm in his adherence to the 
mechanical explanation of nature; he regarded animals as 
automata and treated even human physiology as a chapter 
of physics. But he described rational mind as nowise material 
or in space and distinguished it as thinking substance. 
This cosmological dualism was directly embroiled in the 
problem of the causal interaction or other relation of mind 
and body. Descartes was bound to insist on the irreducible 
duality of material and mental substances, but our every 
sense perception and every voluntary action were perplexing 
instances of their interaction. This problem, as we all know, 
has engrossed systematic philosophers and psychologists 
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through the ages. It can scarcely be said that its final solution 
has been attained. But it is of interest to note the growing 
conviction that mind cannot be understood as a kind of sub- 
stance, and to consider the proposed accounts of it as a 
process and a system of activities. This advance beyond 
substantialism, beyond the doctrine of Substance, marked the 
developing course of empiricism and was explicitly realized 
in the Critical philosophy of Kant. 
Before Kant, the traditional account of nature as a system 
of beings or substances had been criticized by Leibniz. Many 
thinkers, ever since Plato and Aristotle, had questioned the 
adequacy of a cosmology of moving material particles to ex- 
plain life and mind and rational thought. But Leibniz ques- 
tioned this cosmology in the physical field. The real nature 
of things, he reasoned, cannot be understood so long as we 
regard them in merely extensional or dimensional terms as 
so many substances or volumes of occupied space. A body 
is not so much a thing of a certain size and shape located and 
moving or being moved somewhere. Do you recognize a 
magnet if you simply regard its size and shape? A body is 
essentially a certain unique center or focus of activity. Nature 
is a system of activities. 
The activism of Leibniz anticipated significantly some basic 
ideas in the contemporary revision of physical science. The 
growing ascendency of the category of Time has required 
the replacement of geometric by dynamic terms in the de- 
scription of nature. The most characteristic feature of our 
modern thought, as Samuel Alexander observed, has been 
"the discovery of Time," and the view of things as ongoing 
in time has emphasized agencies rather than substances. In  
our day Whitehead has affirmed this principle explicitly: 
"Nature is a process." I t  is beyond our competence or con- 
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cern to consider here the specific scientific evidence on which 
this conclusion rests. But we are interested in its philosophical 
bearing. Some religionists have derived much comfort from 
the modern dynamical view of nature, as though it somehow 
safeguarded spiritual values. I t  should be clear that the 
shift in cosmological emphasis from substances to energies 
or activities does not in itself confirm the reality of spiritual 
character in the world. Nature may be described as a system 
of processes, but processes explicitly and thoroughly mechani- 
cal. Or it may be regarded as an ascending scale of activities, 
from star dust to spirit. 
Our modern dynamic view of nature is thus confronted 
with a problem similar to that which faced the earlier cos- 
mology of substances. How are we to represent reality so 
as to give due recognition to all its types or grades of mani- 
festation? If the variety of processes in nature is ultimately 
reducible to a uniformly mechanical character, not only 
biology but also psychology and all the humanistic sciences 
would have to leain their final wisdom from physics. But if 
nature is a hierarchy of processes, then the various stages 
or grades in the scale may well require radically different 
principles of interpretation. So the modern dynamical revi- 
sion in physical science has not settled the perennial issue 
in philosophy; it has reopened and emphasized it in a revised 
perspective. Activism, the conception of nature as Process, 
centers its attention not on things but on doings. The words 
of Faust come to our minds: "In the beginning was Action." 
But directly we are bound to ask: "What Action?" What sort 
of activities are evidenced in nature and in men's lives and 
careers? 
The issue before us has been familiarly stated as mechanism 
versus teleology. Aristotle insisted on final or purposive cause 
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as a needed principle of explanation. In accounting for the 
course of events in nature, we should consider not only the 
stuff or form of mechanical operation of things but also their 
purpose. Medieval and modern theologians confidently in- 
terpreted this purposive or teleological aspect of things as 
evidence of God's creative design in nature. This may be 
called a teleology from above; it found systematic expres- 
sion in the famous argument from design to prove God's 
existence, and it reached its summits of affirmation during 
the eighteenth century. These summits appeared sublime but 
were very precarious. The extreme teleologists undertook to 
explain the entire course of nature as a planned economy 
devised and directed by a benevolent Providence for the 
well-being of man, the crown of creation. Long shelves of 
treatises, unreadable today, expounded the operation of God's 
design in nature as evidenced by the study of birds, of fishes, 
of stones, of anything: ornithotheology, ichthyotheology, 
petrotheology! This pious exaltation of purposiveness ignored 
the limits of good sense and aroused a sharp reaction. Voltaire 
cited ironically the remarkable design of Divine Providence 
which directed the course of great rivers to bring them to the 
sea in convenient proximity to men's important centers of 
navigation. 
Against teleology, modern science from the outset empha- 
sized the mechanical operation of nature, This scientific tem- 
per characterized a number of distinguished philosophers, 
not all of them strict mechanists. Bacon preferred Democritus 
to Aristotle; Hobbes espoused and developed the Democ- 
ritean atomism; Spinoza, while recognizing the distinctive 
reality of mind, explicitly rejected final causes as principles 
of explanation in nature. Throughout the history of modern 
thought this resistance to teleology has marked the various 
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forms of naturalism. Firmly entrenched in the system of 
physical laws, the more extreme mechanists have sought to 
reduce all scientific accounts of life and mind to a basically 
physical statement. Feuerbach expressed this conviction in 
a dietetic pun: Der Mensch ist zrias er isst, "Man is what he 
eats," MoIeschott proposed to express mental activity chemi- 
cally, in terms of phosphorus, fat, and water. Vogt described 
thought bIuntly as an organic secretion. 
Incomparably more important than the materialistic epi- 
grams was Darwin's reconstruction of biology. His evolution- 
ary method was signiEcant in two ways, both relevant to 
our present discussion. By his investigation of the origin of 
species and his exploration of the ongoing stream of life, 
Darwin shifted the biological emphasis from the description 
and classification of living beings, as in the botany of 
Linnaeus, to the explanation of the genesis of biological types 
and living processes. In philosophical terms, Darwin's doc- 
trine was a sort of biological activism. This was one im- 
portant systematic aspect of the evolutionary theory. 
The other aspect of evolutionism is also significant, but it 
has received a twofold interpretation. The prevailing view 
held by evolutionists is that Darwin's method integrated 
biology with the other mechanistic sciences. By his explana- 
tion of the origin of species Darwin ruled out the old tradi- 
tional appeal to design in nature. The vast system of bio- 
logical species was explained in strictly causal terms as the 
factual series of effects of various environmental conditions 
on various forn~s of life. The limited nourishment or other 
means of survival determined the preservation of certain 
adapted and fit species and the extinction of others. Darwin's 
survival of the fittest had no teleological connotation. The 
fittest in any environment were those that could and did 
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survive. This statement was in fact as mechanistic as the 
statenlent that a bar of copper will be preserved when ex- 
posed to rain water which will cause a bar of iron to rust. 
While Darwin thus explained the factual survival or extinc- 
tion of species with certain variations in certain environ- 
ments, he did not explain in distinct terms how certain vali- 
ations originate, and he regarded the problem of the primal 
source of life as beyond his province. Some later evolutionists 
have been more confident. Their mechanistic bias may be 
gauged by their response to the announcement by a noted 
geneticist that the mutation rates of fruit flies could be in- 
creased by exposure to X-rays and that these mutations were 
transmissible to offspring. The whole course and manifold 
currents of life could conceivably be regarded as a vast series 
of physical and chemical processes. 
But while evolutionary biology, strictly interpreted, is 
mechanistic in tenor and is so intended explicitly by most of 
its exponents, evolutionism has not been without certain 
teleological overtones. The survival of the fittest has seemed 
to warrant the inference of a progress in nature. Darwin 
himself yielded occasionally to this tendency to give the 
evolutionary mechanism a finally commendatory teleological 
slant. At the close of his Origin of Species he wrote: "We 
may look with some confidence to a secure future of great 
length. And as natural selection works solely by and for the 
good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will 
tend to progress towards perfection." I t  needs little argument 
to show that Darwin's evolutionary biology did not warrant 
his use of the terms "good," "progress," and "perfection" in 
his laudation of nature. His own doctrine taught strictly, not 
that natural selection works solely for the good of each being 
or tends to progress towards perfection, but only that under 
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certain environmental conditions certain results of survival 
or extinction are effected. We should not be so concerned 
to elaborate this criticism. The importance of this and similar 
passages in evolutionary writings is that they provide evi- 
dence of the persistently teleological view of living processes 
which even pronounced evolutionists share. 
As is commonly familiar, the basic idea of evolution as 
development has proved to be a fruitful principle of explana- 
tion in the various humanistic sciences. While many workers 
in these fields have proceeded to mechanistic conclusions, 
others have seen in the complex course of civilization evi- 
dences of some immanent teleology. Some philosophers of 
evolution have interpreted it as teleological at  the core though 
factually mechanistic in its detailed operation. Bergson's 
creative evolution and Samuel Alexander's emergent evolu- 
tion are instances of the conviction that bare mechanics can- 
not ultimately explain the ongoing course of life and thought. 
The ideas of nisus, of productive tendencies, of directive.ac- 
tivities, of progress, all signify a recognition of teleology in 
some sense. 
This teleological outlook in the interpretation of biological 
processes becomes more common and imperative when we 
deal wit11 mental processes. The activity of intelligence is 
characteristically conceined with meanings and values, and 
these transcend the range of mechanistic expression. When 
Darwin writes of the "progress towards perfection" in na- 
ture, his words cannot be comprehended in his evolutionary 
biology, but our evaluative intelligence understands them at 
once. So a problem is bound to confront the philosophical 
mind: How are we to expand or revise our view of reality as 
Process so that we may be able to comprehend, that is, to 
include and to understand its meaning and value aspects 
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which are manifested to us in our human intelligent activi- 
ties? 
The adequate philosophical concept or perspective which 
we need here must be one that connotes not merely events, 
bare occurrences, but meaningful processes, significant and 
valuable activities. The idea of mechanism cannot have this 
connotation, and in fact it explicitly precludes it. The idea 
of evolution would not serve in so far as it emphasizes factual 
causal operation, but it raises a demand for the needed idea 
as soon as we begin to consider evolution as a developing 
process revealing some significant direction and progress. 
In our time Croce and after him Collingwood and others 
have proposed the idea of History to express the view of 
reality as ongoing, significant activity. Of course this is not 
the concept of history as merely the written record of some 
body of past events. Even here critical historians have urged, 
against the notion of a historical linkage of bare discrete facts, 
the idea of history as an interpretation of a progressively 
significant course of events. History in this philosophical use 
of the word is more analogous to what we intend to say when 
we speak of a person's life-history, that is, his unfolding 
career, what he is and has been achieving and has become 
through the years, what he has meant and means to him- 
self and to others. Even so we may consider the history of a 
social movement, of a people, or more universally the history 
of mankind in its various significant expressions, science or 
art or religion. The histoly of philosophy is philosophy itself 
in its manifold self-expression; it is the utterance and the 
living reality of thinking mind, man thinking most clearly 
and persistently, most deeply and integrally. 
The term "history" has been applied also outside the field 
of human activities, but with various shades of appraisal. We 
The Rice Institute Pamphlet 
speak of natural history rather loosely, to suggest an inter- 
esting survey rather than a systematic investigation of nature. 
Francis Bacon included in his encyclopedic project for mod- 
ern science one hundred and thirty natural histories-of 
comets, earthquakes, floods, and drouths as well as of vege- 
table, animal, and human matters and processes. These were 
to be studies introductory to the scientific explanation of 
nature. But the more philosophical meaning of history, which 
is usually discussed in its humanistic applications, has been 
urged as significant also in the interpretation of nature 
generally. Natural science itself has been described by 
Collingwood as a form of thought that "exists and always 
has existed in a context of history, and depends on historical 
thought for its existence." 
The idea of history, phiIosophically reinterpreted, may well 
serve to express the value aspect of unfolding significance of 
reality as we know it especially in human activities. But there 
is another and essential characteristic of value which is not 
quite comprehended in the idea of history, namely the dra- 
matic character of values as involving an interplay of alter- 
natives. Factually considered, the different beings and proc- 
esses in nature are not viewed as of different rank. While they 
may be distinguished, they are all naturally on a par. But the 
moment we consider anything in a personal perspective 
which reveals some value aspect, our minds are engaged in 
a relative estimate and eventual choice between contending 
meanings or purposes or ideals. Our views become issues. 
Each value manifests its meaning and its r6le in our experi- 
ence as a contender for our preference and choice, contending 
with some related or opposite value. This so-called bipolarity 
of alternatives may be seen through the entire series of hu- 
man activities, and in each case a certain value, while it may 
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be viewed in its field as distinguished from other values in 
other fields, is recognized and appraised more characteristi- 
cally in its contending relation to its counter value. So we 
may consider the familiar alternatives in our experience of 
values: happiness or miseiy, truth or error, beauty and har- 
mony or ugly discord, justice or injustice, virtue or vice. The 
issue is not always one of positive or negative values, involv- 
ing good or evil. The choice may concern relative worth in a 
hierarchy of values calling for critical preference rather than 
emphatic approval and utter condemnation, 
The tern1 "dramatic" is used here to describe these alterna- 
tives which are so characteristic of the world of values. The 
idea of Dranla has often been used analogically to express 
men's estimates of the course of existence. Is the drama of 
our lives a tragedy or a comedy? Horace Walpole's epigram 
comes to mind directly: "The world is a comedy to those who 
think, a tragedy to those who feel," The pessimism of Scho- 
penhauer exposed human life as a tragedy in its essentials, 
but in its ignoble details a comedy. In his vision of genius 
Dante contemplated the world-order and man's life and 
destiny under God's just providence as the Divine Comedy. 
In our time the Spaniard Miguel de Unamuno advocated a 
dramatic philosophy in his work, The Tragic Sense of Life, 
William James in a well-known passage portrayed our ex- 
istence dramatically as a struggle of values: "It feeb like a 
real fight,-as if there were something really wild in the uni- 
verse which we, with all our idealities and faithfulness, are 
needed to redeem." Hartley Bun: Alexander wrote a brilliant 
essay on "Drama as a Cosmic Category." Our brief discussion 
does not claim to be exhaustive. It is meant to reaffirm the 
significance of including Drama, the dramatic perspective, 
as one of the basic views of reality which philosophy should 
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include in its accounts of the world, the recognition of hu- 
man experience and its values. 
Philosophical activism, emphasizing Process as the funda- 
mental aspect of reality, should not be reluctant to consider 
the ultimate implications of Drama. Drama meant orginally 
action, a way of doing, The dramatic view of life revealed 
an interplay and a stiuggle of active r6les of which the plays 
on the stage were artistic reenactments. The Greek anthro- 
pomorphic imagination personalized the counterplay of 
values even as it personalized the aspects and forces of na- 
ture and the various cosmic agencies in its pantheon and 
mythology. Philosophical reflection outgrew mythology and 
anthropomorphism, but it was confronted in its turn with the 
problems which have never ceased to engross moral, artistic, 
and religious insight. The visions of poets and saints are 
themselves experiences which the philosopher must under- 
stand and integrate with the rest of his account of reality. 
A thorough philosophy must be one that comprehends poetry 
and religion as adequately as it comprehends the physical 
sciences. 
It has been said that as poetic genius reaches its greatest 
achievement it strikes the tragic note. For tragedy expresses 
most emphatically the struggle of values in which n~en's 
lives are embroiled. Values are manifested in any situation 
or process seen in a personal perspective, where desires or 
beliefs or ideals or wills are involved. We may adapt the 
wisdom of the Stoic sages to our present discussion: tragedy 
arises when a certain temper and will are brought to bear on 
certain conditions and events. The crisis that eventuates may 
be a struggle of the human will with something wild in the 
universe, as James wrote, or a clash with other wilIs that cross 
it, or it may be a tension in the will itself, a personality self- 
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rending in the crisis of counter-motives. Greek tragedy por- 
trayed the conflict between a will heroic but faulty in some 
important respect and the cosmic order of necessity or 
august right, Nemesis with its inevitable doom. Modern 
tragedy has emphasized the crisis in character itself, the 
wrenching of the will's career by callous circumstance, 
where one's purposes are flouted by one's own desires or 
spurned by a dull or hostile society. But in all these cases 
tragedy has expressed in an intense form the essentially 
dramatic nature of value as a counteraction of alternatives. 
We should remember that tragedy was religious in its 
ancient motives, and in its modein themes also the religious 
strain has persisted in some form. Religion throughout its 
history has expressed in various ways men's conviction of the 
supreme reality of the highest values. This conviction has 
been men's faith in God. But against these highest and holy 
values religion has also centered its attention on the callous, 
the corrupt, and the hostile, on evil powers and principalities, 
sinful in human lives, titanic or satanic in the cosmic scheme. 
This is the abysmal problem of evil which has divided re- 
ligions and philosophies, with their rival solutions and their 
common quandaries. 
The significance of Drama as a basic view of reality is 
shown by the tendency of both theology and philosophy to 
give their dramatic value judgments a metaphysical connota- 
tion. The supreme in value has been viewed as the most real, 
the first principle and the finally prevailing. The antitl~esis, 
God and Matter, represented to Plato not only the contrast 
of rational good and bodily-sensuaI evil but also the supreme 
reality of Divine Reason over against the misleading appear- 
ance and non-being of material existence. Before the age 
of Plato, Gotama Buddha had traced the origin of evil in 
56 The  Rice Institute Pamphlet 
the deluded self-engrossment of men, and taught salvation 
through enlightenment. Man can be delivered from evil and 
misery only as he is delivered from ignorance, as he realizes 
that his ego is impermanent like froth, and that truth, reality, 
and blessedness are to be reached in the eternal peace of 
Nirvana: a religious and a metaphysical surcease, Zoro- 
astrianism regarded the whole world-process and all men's 
lives as locked in the dualism of good and evil: light and 
darkness, tsuth and falsehood, purity and corruption, life 
and death. The evil powers were seen as world-wide, old as 
creation, but the Zoroastrian did not admit their final reality. 
A great day of destiny was surely conling when the good 
God Ahura-Mazda would overcome and utterly destroy the 
fiend Ahriman and his evil cohorts, Christian theology reveals 
a similar balancing of motives. The world with all therein is 
the creation of perfect Omnipotence, but is it not Satan's 
realm, a world of corruption and sin? Yet it is also the stage 
of the divine drama of redemption, tragic in its enactment 
through the ages, sublime in its ultimately consummation. 
Without the flame of religious utterance, Leibniz expressed 
this dual theological-metaphysical conviction: "God is in- 
finite, and the devil is limited." 
In our discussion so far the moral viewpoint has not been 
considered explicitly, and yet it must be clear that the con- 
flicting alternatives which we have noted in tragedy and in 
religion imply decidedly moral issues. This whole dramatic 
view of man's life and of man's world is an ethical outlook. 
Our deliberation, unsettled and then confirmed preference, 
choice, and action-the entire course of a characteristic moral 
experience is concerned with alternative values, rival desires 
or interests or purposes and ideals. There is, to be sure, a 
process of factual determination here. A man's past experi- 
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ence has formed habits and tendencies which may seem to 
operate with almost causal necessity in a new situation. But 
personality is never quite summed up in any simple determin- 
istic formula. The moral crisis engages the self in contending 
directions. His eventual course and character is at issue, what 
he is to be and to become. This complex interplay and re- 
constitution of personality is the drama of moral experience. 
The free self-determination which it reveals is in each case a 
concrete expression of the creative strain in the world of 
values. Without it, we could hardly see how moral choices 
really mattered. The serious view of morality signifies that 
a contest of real import is involved in each moral decision. 
The agent's own character and careel; the well-being of so- 
ciety, and in more ultimate ramifications the whole cosmic 
system of values are concerned in every moral act. It is not 
indifferent; it always matters: this is the note of an alert 
morality. Within a man's range of experience, his every moral 
crisis is his Gethsemane, in which he may be denying or 
reaffirming, betraying or redeeming the higher values. This 
moral insight is at  the root of duty and responsibility. 
Moral experience here manifests the creative power of 
intelligence which is revealed also in poetic or in theoretical 
activity. histotle regarded the intellectual virtues as the 
highest, for in their contemplative perfection a man is most 
nearly godlike. God's reason, as Aristotle called it, is poetic, 
creative, and man's moral experience is also in its degree a 
creative realization of values. We may apply to men's moral 
decisions the words of Goethe's heavenly mystic choir: 
The Unattainable 
Here is achieved, 
We have only glanced here at several aspects of reality 
which have engaged men's critical reflection. The progres- 
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sive development of philosophy has been marked by its alert- 
ness to various perspectives of interpretation and also by its 
concern to avoid onesidedness and to achieve integral correla- 
tion and synthesis of standpoints. This dual purpose should 
continue to guide philosophic thought. We should neither 
overcomplicate nor oversimplify our cosmic problem. Phi- 
losophy, like science, views and must view the world as 
intelligible. Our basic conviction here may be expressed in 
Hegel's words: "The secret nature of the universe has no 
power in itself which could offer permanent resistance to 
the courage of science." But we should also apply to our 
intel-pretation of nature the words of the Fourth Gospel: "In 
my Father's house are many mansions." Nature also is a 
manifold system; it  has nlany mansions. We should explore 
them all, and as someone has remarked, we should remember 
that they are not all on the same level. The fundamental 
cosmic categories are different and complementary ways in 
which reality can be viewed and interpreted. 
Substance and process are two such fundamental aspects, 
and our factual account of nature seems to involve our con- 
tinual shift from one to the other. But it is when we under- 
take to understand and to express adequately the nature of 
the process of being that we come to realize more fully the 
range of reality. It can be viewed, first, as a vast causal 
mechanism. The exploration of all its intricate objects, con- 
ditions, and connections, with the formulation of the princi- 
ples of their various unifolmities, forms the impressive system 
of the physical sciences. Related to this mechanistic outlook 
on nature, but raising important new problems, is the evolu- 
tionary view which has proved epoch-making in biology and 
has also been fruitful in its extension to other fields. Its ap- 
plication to the humanistic sciences has disclosed both the 
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essential correlation of all living processes and also the dis- 
tinctive characteristics of human intelligent activities. In the 
interpretation of men's lives, individual and social, the view- 
point of evolution is inadequate if its mechanistic aspect is 
emphasized. Evolution here points to history as the more 
fruitful category and principle of humanistic interpretation: 
the view of human lives as significant processes in which 
values are pursued and realized. This view of reality as a 
vast process of significance and values which is especially 
manifested in human lives can be interpreted even more 
fixitfully by the category of drama, It reveals to us essential 
characteristics of poetic, religious, and moral experience. 
While men have often spoken figuratively of the drama of 
existence, its tragedy or its comic aspects, the more thorough 
analysis and use of drama as a principle of basic inteipreta- 
tion is an important task for philosophy, with real promise 
for its effective execution. 
The tentative character of this essay is evident and need 
not be pointed out. It is to be regarded as a brief outline of 
more extensive work on which the writer is engaged. If any 
closing word is needed at  this point, it is by way of a plea 
for a critical correlation of phiIosophical standpoints. A really 
scientac, that is, knowledge-yielding philosophy must be 
one which avoids abstract onesidedness and unwarranted 
exclusion of important aspects of nature and human experi- 
ence. And it must be one which does not confuse the basic 
views of reality, but recognizes the significance of each view 
or aspect in its relevant perspective. 
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